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INTRODUCTION
It is anecdotal that in every challenge there lies an opportu-
nity.  Community organizer Saul Alinsky applied this principle to
political movements when he wrote to young activists, “If you push
a negative hard and deep enough it will break through into its
counterside.”1  A major challenge of the present era for progres-
sives working toward the expansion of civil and labor rights has
been our legal system’s generally hostile attitude to their agenda.
The “originalist” approach to civil rights has largely rejected expan-
sive readings of the Constitution under the argument that its text
was never intended to cover “new and unjustifiable claims.”2
Encapsulated within this philosophy, however, is a view of the
past that obscures important aspects of our legal heritage.  Con-
* J.D. Candidate 2009, City University of New York School of Law.
1 SAUL D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS 129 (1971).
2 See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 159 (1990).
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servative originalism ignores the fact that the amendments to the
Constitution that were born out of movements to expand rights are
not the legacy of conservatives, but of reformers and radicals.  It
dismisses the possibility that a document born of a revolution and
drafted by activists could still have radical force today.  Given the
Constitution’s origin, there is little reason to assume that original-
ism is a necessarily conservative philosophy.  To embrace the origi-
nal understanding of the rights-granting provisions of our most
revered legal document is to adopt the perspective of people who
were willing to fight and die for those rights.  Those who claim to
honor the legacy of the Framers by limiting the force of their ideals
imagine nearsighted visionaries and milquetoast revolutionaries.
In the case of the Thirteenth Amendment,3 there is evidence
that the original understanding was far more expansive and radical
than the modern one.  The Thirteenth Amendment was passed
shortly after the Civil War, when the Radical Republicans domi-
nated Congress.4  The Congressional debates from this era reveal
an understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment, and of the insti-
tution of slavery, that went far beyond an end to the physical bond-
age suffered by slaves.  As explained by one of the Amendment’s
leading advocates, “[W]e have advocated the rights of the black
man because the black man was the most oppressed type of the
toiling men of this country . . . .  The same influences that go to
keep down and crush down the rights of the poor black man bear
down and oppress the poor white laboring man.”5  The Radicals
saw a deep connection between the slave and the “free” worker.
Their contemporaneous understanding of slavery included a criti-
cal view of the work relationship, one that recognized the existence
of social dimensions of work affecting not only the entire life of the
laborer, slave or free, but also the fabric of society and the legal
system itself.  For them, an end to “involuntary servitude” could
only come about through a transformation of both the work rela-
tionship and the social status of working people
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §§ 1, 2.
Section 1.  Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punish-
ment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2.  Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation.
Id.
4 Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 437, 447 (1989).
5 Sen. Henry Wilson, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866), quoted in
VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 440.
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Although not fully developed at the time of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s passage, the “free labor” ideology did not end with
Reconstruction.  It found expression throughout the history of the
labor movement during the early 20th century.6  It became the the-
oretical basis for a wide array of labor reforms that eventually
formed the basis of the Wagner Act.7  The Wagner Act version of
labor rights, however, was ultimately much more limited than the
Thirteenth Amendment version.  Rather than explicitly passing la-
bor law reform as an extension of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
promise of freedom from involuntary servitude, progressive lawyers
adopted a strategy of grounding the Act in the Commerce Clause,
and they succeeded.8
Scholars have suggested that if the Wagner Act had been
passed as an expression of Congress’s power to eliminate involun-
tary servitude under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the consti-
tutional history of the following eighty years might have been far
different.9  Labor rights would have been an expression of funda-
mental freedoms, rather than a means to promote the “free flow of
commerce.”10  The commerce clause approach, which eventually
prevailed, opened the door to the Taft–Hartley amendments,11
and allowed courts to gradually chip away at the freedoms claimed
6 James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941 (1997) [here-
inafter Pope, Labor’s Constitution].
7 The National Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 151–69).
8 James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and
the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24 (2002)
[hereinafter Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause].
9 Id. at 115–119.
10 The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize
and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest,
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or ob-
structing commerce . . . .  It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions
to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these ob-
structions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining . . . .
29 U.S.C.A. §151 (West 2008).
11 Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 141–144, 167, 171–187).  Among other amendments to the Wagner Act, 49 Stat.
449 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. 151–169), Taft–Hartley added to the preamble cited
above:
[C]ertain practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and
members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or ob-
structing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such com-
merce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through
concerted activities which impair the interest of the public in the free
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by working people, in the name of promoting the free flow of
goods and services.12  The commerce-based concept of labor law
analogized labor rights to rights over property, rather than tying
them to the deeper social dimensions of work.
The vision put forward by the Wagner Act also built an admin-
istrative apparatus that put lawyers and labor “experts” in a domi-
nant and dominating role within organized labor.13  It facilitated
the evolution of a labor movement that moved away from what re-
formers have called “social movement unionism”14 and toward a
bureaucratic “business model.”15  Even at their most radical, the
unions that have grown under the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) now talk about organizing, at least publicly, in terms of
adding numbers of dues-paying members, rather than in terms of
workers’ commitment to and ownership of a movement to pro-
mote rights.16  Current proposals to reform labor law reflect this;
flow of such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary
condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.
29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 2008).  Thus, Taft–Hartley posited that the elimination of
strikes is necessary to safeguard workers’ rights to organize, and thereby made the
elimination of strikes and “other forms of industrial unrest” part of the policy of the
United States.
12 See generally ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE
ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 6–7 (2006) (listing examples of how courts have weakened
labor protections).  Dannin’s argument is that judicial interpretations, rather than the
Wagner Act itself, is to blame for the diminishment of labor rights over the past six
decades.  Dannin finds the source of judges’ restrictive readings in their class bias and
in their general ignorance of labor law.  Among the judicial “amendments” to the
N.L.R.A., she names the limited remedies afforded to the NLRB, the ability of em-
ployers to impose their final offers when an impasse is reached in bargaining, and the
“right” to replace economic strikers on a permanent basis. Id.
13 See Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause, supra note 8, at
26–28.
14 DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE: LABOR AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 19
(2003).
15 MIKE PARKER & MARTHA GRUELLE, DEMOCRACY IS POWER: REBUILDING UNIONS
FROM THE BOTTOM UP 22–25 (1999).
16
The 1.9 million-member Service Employees International Union is the
fastest-growing union in North America . . . .  Since . . . 1996, nearly
900,000 workers have united in SEIU . . . .  SEIU is the largest health
care union . . . the largest property services union . . . and the second
largest public employee union . . . .  SEIU is the nation’s largest union
of health care workers with over half of the union’s 1.8 million mem-
bers working in the field, including 110,000 nurses and 40,000 doctors
. . . .  440,000 home care and 160,000 nursing home workers are also
winning improvements in wages and benefits. In April 2005, in one of
the largest union election victories ever, 41,000 home care workers in
Michigan voted to unite with SEIU . . . .  49,000 Illinois family child care
providers joined together in SEIU . . . .  SEIU is the largest union of
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the Employee Free Choice Act,17 the current legislative project of
the AFL–CIO, would make it easier for workers to join unions, but
says little about their participation in them.18
The original understanding of servitude and of labor, from
the standpoint of the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers, was one
that went beyond economic conditions.  It included the social
dimensions of the work relationship.  Slavery affected the rights of
laborers, both free and slave, by denying them full participation in
society, and by compromising their human and civil rights as well
as their economic status.  Altering this system required change at
many levels: in the courts, in the legislature, and in civil society
itself.  As carried on by the labor movement, the free labor ideal
would come to include efforts to increase the rights of workers
through litigation, legislation, and organizing.
This Comment will consider these three levels of change.  I
will begin with a brief review of the relevant history, as well as of
the original labor vision of the Thirteenth Amendment.  This his-
tory will continue in the next section, as I discuss how “involuntary
servitude” has been defined by the courts.  I will suggest areas for
expansion of that definition that could encompass broader labor
rights.  I will then discuss legislation that has been passed under
section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, and how courts have
treated the scope of Congress’s power to legislate under that sec-
tion.  Finally, I will discuss what the Thirteenth Amendment vision
means for organizing, and how claims to fundamental rights pro-
tected by the Thirteenth Amendment could provide a unifying
theme for workers’ movements.  I will conclude by exploring how
worker centers might operate as a vehicle for promoting this alter-
native agenda, putting forward a rights-based vision that is more
aligned with international labor standards and that has greater rhe-
torical and legal force for workers in America, both native and for-
eign-born.
child care workers in America, representing more than 200,000 people
who work in child care and early education.
Service Employees’ International Union, A Closer Look Inside Labor’s Fastest-Grow-
ing Union, http://www.seiu.org/about/closer%5Flook/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
17 Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/ (search term “Employee Free Choice Act” in “Search Bill Text”).
18 See James Gray Pope, Peter Kellman & Ed Bruno, The Employee Free Choice Act and
a Long-term Strategy for Winning Workers’ Rights, WORKINGUSA, March 2008, at 127.  Ad-
mittedly, a greater degree of member engagement in unions is unlikely to come from
reforms in the law; it has a good deal more to do with organizing and with the inter-
nal politics of unions themselves.  But as the history of the Wagner Act suggests, legal
paradigms can shape unions’ understanding of how they relate to their members.
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I. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND FREE LABOR
A. Reconstruction
Lea VanderVelde has documented the legislative history and
the congressional debates surrounding the passage of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.19  That history, as she persuasively argues,
reveals an underlying philosophy that went beyond the abolition of
slavery and aimed to promote the dignity of all labor.  Proponents
of the Thirteenth Amendment following the Civil War were split
between two political factions: Abolitionists, who were primarily
concerned with eliminating slavery, and Republicans from the Free
Soil Party who had deep roots in the labor movement of the time.20
This wing of the party, the so-called “Radical Republicans,” ob-
jected to slavery on the basis that it degraded the status of all labor.
Henry Wilson, the foremost proponent of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment in the Senate, summed up this perspective in an appeal to
white workers in Boston: “Put the brand of degradation upon the
brow of one working man and the toiling millions of the globe
share the degradation.”21
The radicals’ objections to slavery were more than simply
moral.  They had practical legal ramifications.  As VanderVelde
points out, in the economy of the time, slavery was simply one espe-
cially oppressive form of employment relation, in “a progression of
distinct status positions: peons, bonded servants, apprentices, em-
ployees not under written contract, employees under written con-
tract and, finally, professional status employees.”22  All of these
status positions had broader social aspects.  Just as property is cor-
rectly understood as a bundle of rights in relation to a thing, one’s
status defined others’ rights in relation to that individual; slaves,
for example, could not enter into contracts, have families, testify in
court, or hold property.23  They could be beaten by their masters;24
an apprentice, in contrast, could not be beaten.25  The law prohib-
ited one employer from hiring away another’s employee, just as it
prohibited one master from taking another’s slave.26  The impact
19 VanderVelde, supra note 4.
20 Id. at 444–48.
21 Senator Henry Wilson, How Ought Workingmen to Vote in the Coming Elec-
tion?, Address to East Boston Workers (Oct. 15, 1860) quoted in VanderVelde, supra
note 4, at 467.
22 VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 441.
23 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
24 See Echols v. Dodd, 20 Tex. 190 (1857).
25 Inhabitants of Vinalhaven v. Ames, 32 Me. 299 (1850).
26 Campbell v. Cooper, 34 N.H. 49 (1856).
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of the Thirteenth Amendment was thus far greater than is com-
monly understood today.  By analogy, we might imagine the effect
of an amendment stating that, “no person shall hold a property
interest in land within the United States.”  Such a provision would
sweep away entire branches of law.  Beyond this, it would raise seri-
ous doubts about the foundations of other rights.
The Radicals’ vision of “free labor” encompassed these social
dimensions of work, and recognized the wide array of oppressive
statuses.  This led them to go beyond slavery and include the term
“involuntary servitude” in the Thirteenth Amendment.  While the
term “slavery” had a commonly understood definition, the mean-
ing of “involuntary servitude” was subject to wider interpretation; a
great deal of debate in Congress concerned the scope of this
term.27
The Radical Republicans’ power in Congress gradually faded,
and Reconstruction came to an end.  The extent to which the “in-
voluntary servitude” language might be applied to working people
not in an apparent position of coerced labor, though, would re-
main an important issue in the decades to follow.  During this time,
the economy and the shape of work relations were changing in
dramatic ways, and the nascent labor movement was emerging to
meet these changes.
B. The Labor Movement
At the turn of the century, two of the major legal weapons
used by employers against organized labor were anti-strike injunc-
tions and yellow-dog contracts.28  Unions railed against these court-
imposed and court-enforced attacks, and argued that they inflicted
forms of involuntary servitude on workers.29  To trade unionists of
the time, a court that ordered strikers back to work compelled
them to labor under conditions that they found unacceptable—a
situation tantamount to slavery.30  The American Federation of La-
27 VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 454–59.  “Involuntary Servitude” would come to
include debt peonage, a practice then common in New Mexico. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1994 (West 2008).  It was eventually applied to a wide range of laws that inhibited
individuals from leaving their employment, although interestingly, most of these laws
were first established in Northern states, and only adopted in Southern states follow-
ing the Civil War. See VanderVelde, supra note 4, at 486–95.
28 See Debs–Jones–Douglass Institute, Toward a New Labor Law, 8 n.24 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.djdinstitute.org/laborlaw.pdf.  “Yellow dog” contracts were con-
tracts between a worker and an employer by which the worker agreed not to join or
be represented by a labor union.
29 Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 6, at 964.
30 At a time when slavery was still a living memory for many workers, this connec-
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bor adopted a policy, at its 1909 convention, of openly defying
court orders that enjoined what they believed was a constitutionally
protected right to strike.31  The Federation’s position was that a
worker faced with an anti-strike injunction should “refuse obedi-
ence and . . . take whatever consequences may ensue.”32  This legal
theory was echoed in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n., in which he wrote that an in-
junction against a refusal to work was an “instrument for imposing
restraints upon labor which reminds one of involuntary
servitude.”33
There were broader contours to the unions’ defiance, and
their understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment went beyond
the right to strike.  Besides referring to the condition of the unor-
ganized worker as “wage slavery,” the labor movement argued that
workers had rights that were distinct from, and superior to, prop-
erty rights, and explicitly argued that the Thirteenth Amendment
protected these rights on their own terms, not as expressions of
property rights:  “If . . . you construe labor as being property and
the right to labor a property right, then the Thirteenth Amend-
ment goes into the wastebasket entirely,” argued Andrew Furuseth,
President of the Sailors’ Union of the Pacific.34
The labor movement used this theory proactively as well as
rhetorically.  In addition to mobilizing constitutional arguments
against anti-labor laws, unions lobbied for legislation prohibiting
anti-strike injunctions and protecting organizing rights under the
power granted to Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment.  They
argued that true freedom of labor could only exist when workers
were free to organize, and that ensuring these rights was a means
to the elimination of involuntary servitude.  This argument posed a
direct challenge to the theory of economic due process invoked in
Lochner v. New York35 and similar cases.
Under the Lochner theory, liberty of contract existed between
workers and employers because workers were free to quit if they
tion was clear for those who had lived as both slaves and as workers laboring under
court injunctions.  George Echols, a union activist, testifying before Congress about
the suppression of a miners’ strike in West Virginia, said, “I was raised a slave . . . and I
know the time when I was a slave, and I feel just like we feel now.”  Pope, Labor’s
Constitution, supra note 6, at 981.
31 Debs–Jones–Douglass Institute, supra note 28, at 10.
32 Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra note 6, at 968.
33 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n., 274 U.S. 37, 65
(1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34 Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause, supra note 8, at 24.
35 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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were dissatisfied with the terms and conditions of their employ-
ment; indeed, this right was protected by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.36  But labor argued that as an individual right, the ability to
quit one’s job was empty, and its exercise reflected a condition of
slavery, not of liberty: “just imagine what a wonderful influence
such an individual would have, say for instance [on] the U.S. Steel
Corporation,” remarked Samuel Gompers.37
Although Andrew Furuseth and others fought to ground the
Norris–LaGuardia Act,38 The National Industrial Recovery Act,39
and the Wagner Act in the Thirteenth Amendment, all but the first
of these were explicitly passed as exercises of Congress’s powers
under the Commerce Clause.40  As James Pope has documented,
this was largely due to the influence of progressive lawyers like Fe-
lix Frankfurter, whose attitude towards unions’ fundamental-rights
claims was that, “talk of the Thirteenth Amendment is too silly for
any practical lawyer’s use.”41
C. The Commodification of Labor and its Results
James Pope suggests that if unions had been successful, and if
the Wagner Act had been passed under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, constitutional history might have been very different.  The
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the Wagner Act under the Com-
merce Clause in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,42 under the
threat of President Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme and in the
face of one of the largest strike waves in industrial history.43  In the
process, they laid the groundwork for an historic expansion of the
scope of the commerce power.  What they did not consider was
Congress’s ability to enact labor legislation under the Thirteenth
Amendment power to abolish involuntary servitude.  If they had
accepted this theory, Pope argues, modern constitutional law
would not reflect an “infinitely expandable commerce power and
36 See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17–18 (1944).
37 Debate between Samuel Gompers and Henry J. Allen at Carnegie Hall, New
York, May 28, 1920, quoted in Debs–Jones–Douglass Institute, supra note 28, at 9–10.
38 Norris–LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–15).
39 National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
40 “The Congress shall have Power . . . .  To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
41 Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Roger N. Bald-
win, Director, ACLU (Dec. 9, 1931) quoted in Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the
Commerce Clause, supra note 8, at 40.
42 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
43 Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause, supra note 8, at 81–90.
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[a] permanently truncated human rights power . . . .”44
The Wagner Act and its subsequent interpretation by the
courts might have been very different, too.  Because the preamble
to the Wagner Act states, “The denial . . . of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the proce-
dure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of in-
dustrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . ,”45 the Act was
primarily defended as a means to punish and deter strikes.  Not-
withstanding that parts of the Act seem to protect the right to
strike,46 courts have looked to this preamble as a guide to interpret-
ing the Act.  The results have included allowing permanent re-
placement of strikers,47 firing of workers on strike,48 and
discrimination in rehiring of striking workers.49  Furthermore, leg-
islating labor rights as a means of promoting interstate commerce
also allowed Congress to pass the Taft–Hartley Act in 1947, once
again permitting anti-picketing injunctions and the elimination of
secondary boycotts.  Notwithstanding labor’s condemnation of
Taft–Hartley as “the Slave Labor Law,”50 it entered the statute
books as a mere extension of the power to regulate interstate com-
merce, placing a thumb on the scale in what has become accepted
as a necessary “balance” of the rights of labor and capital.51
Some have argued that the labor vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment should be revived, and labor law reform based on a
fundamental rights approach rather than on Congress’s commerce
power.52  They have even gone so far as to suggest that the Thir-
teenth Amendment could be construed to incorporate the First
Amendment against private employers.53  To flesh out a few con-
44 Id. at 5.
45 29 U.S.C.A. §151 (West 2008).
46 “Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”  29 U.S.C.A. § 163
(West 2008).
47 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
48 NLRB v. Sands Manufacturing Company, 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
49 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
50 Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause, supra note 8, at
97–111.
51 See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.
Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (holding that certain state
regulation of labor relations is preempted, as the NLRA and LMRA embody the judg-
ment of Congress as to which “economic weapons” are allowed to parties in a labor
dispute).
52 Debs–Jones–Douglass Institute, supra note 28.
53 Id. at 20.  Because the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law
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crete steps in this direction, it is important to look to how courts
have interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment in the 143 years since
its passage.
II. LITIGATION
A. Peonage and the Civil Rights Section
The first expansion of the Thirteenth Amendment beyond
chattel slavery came in 1867, with the Anti-Peonage Act.54  Initially
aimed at a system of labor that had taken root in New Mexico
under Spanish Colonial rule, the statute prohibited the use of debt
to hold an individual “to service or labor.”55  The law saw little use
until the turn of the century, when it was upheld in the Peonage
Cases.56  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court struck down an Ala-
bama criminal statute which made it a crime to enter into a written
contract for service and obtain money with intent to defraud the
employer, and which made failure to perform the service prima
facie evidence of intent to defraud.57  Taken in combination, these
provisions meant that anyone who entered into a work contract,
got an advance, then failed to perform the work, was guilty of a
crime. Discussing the Thirteenth Amendment’s application to this
law, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he words ‘involuntary
servitude’ have a ‘larger meaning than slavery.’”58  The purpose of
the Amendment, explained the Court, was “to make labor free, by
prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man
is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit . . . .”59
Three years later, in United States v. Reynolds,60 the Court struck
down another Alabama law that allowed an individual to pay a
surety for an individual convicted of a crime, then hold him to a
work contract in order to pay off the debt.  Violation of the con-
tract was punishable by further forced labor.  The Court observed,
“the convict is thus kept chained to an ever-turning wheel of servi-
tude . . . .”61
. . .” regarding freedoms of speech and association, it applies only to state action.  U.S.
CONST. amend I.  The Thirteenth Amendment has no such limitations, applying to
private actors as well as state and federal government.
54 42 U.S.C.A. § 1994 (West 2008).
55 42 U.S.C.A. § 1994 (West 2008).
56 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
57 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
58 Id. at 241.
59 Id.
60 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
61 Id. at 146–7.
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In the late 1930’s, shortly after the Wagner Act had been
passed as an expansion of the commerce power, and as the labor
movement’s constitutional claims were beginning to fade, the Civil
Rights Section was created within the Justice Department under
Attorney General Frank Murphy.62  A former governor of Michi-
gan, Murphy was pro-labor, and he focused the early work of the
Civil Rights Section on prosecuting peonage cases under the Thir-
teenth Amendment.63  The Civil Rights Section’s lawyers litigated
aggressively to try to expand the definitions of debt peonage.64
Murphy was succeeded as Attorney General by Francis Biddle, the
former first chairman of the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”).  Under Biddle’s leadership, the Civil Rights Section suc-
cessfully expanded the application of the anti-peonage law to cases
not involving debt.65  The focus had shifted to include “not only
the availability of exit but also the conditions in which laborers
found themselves working.”66
B. Expanding and Contracting Definitions
The Civil Rights section saw some success in United States v.
Ingalls.67  The case involved a young woman, Dora Jones, who had
been held as a domestic servant for over twenty-five years.  She was
subjected to various forms of abuse; her employers threatened to
blackmail her by revealing that she had what the court character-
ized as “an adulterous relationship”68 with the her employer,
threatening her with prison.  Jones believed that her employers
could make good on these threats.  The district court upheld the
sufficiency of the evidence under the lower court’s definition of
“slave”: “A slave is a person who is wholly subject to the will of an-
other, one who has no freedom of action and whose person and
services are wholly under the control of another, and who is in a
state of enforced compulsory service to another.”69  Recounting
the conditions under which Jones lived and worked, the court
found her “wholly subject” to the will of the defendant.
The Second Circuit pulled back somewhat from this ex-
62 Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1616 (2001).
63 Id. at 1617–18.
64 Id. at 1648–68.
65 Id. at 1651.
66 Id. at 1648.
67 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
68 Id. at 77.
69 Id. at 78.
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panding trend in United States v. Shackney.70  The case concerned a
family of laborers who had been recruited in Mexico to come work
on a farm in Connecticut.  Their living conditions were far below
what they had been promised; the laborers became indebted to the
farm owner, and were threatened with various measures, including
deportation, if they left.  Holding that these facts did not establish
coercion, Judge Friendly stated:
[W]e see no basis for concluding that because the statute can be
satisfied by a credible threat of imprisonment, it should also be
considered satisfied by a threat to have the employee sent back
to the country of his origin, at least absent circumstances which
would make such deportation equivalent to imprisonment or
worse.71
Other courts were willing to take a broader view.  The Fifth
Circuit, in United States v. Bibbs,72 held that “the law takes no ac-
count of the means of coercion.”  The availability of escape made
no difference.  “[A] defendant is guilty of holding a person to in-
voluntary servitude if the defendant has placed him in such fear of
physical harm that the victim is afraid to leave, regardless of the
victim’s opportunities for escape.”73
By this point, courts were willing to consider forms of servi-
tude that applied to individuals other than African Americans,
making good on the claim in The Slaughterhouse Cases that “[i]f
Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop
slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, . . . [the
Thirteenth] amendment may safely be trusted to make it void.”74
In United States v. Mussry the Ninth Circuit echoed this promise:
“we must consider the realities of modern economic life: yester-
day’s slave may be today’s migrant worker or domestic servant.”75
Holding that conduct not including the use or threat of force
could be enough to establish coercion, the court held that “[t]he
crucial factor is whether a person intends to and does coerce an
individual into his service by subjugating the will of the other
person.”76
In 1988, the Supreme Court put a stop to the expanding defi-
70 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964).
71 Id. at 486.
72 564 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1977).
73 Id. at 1168.
74 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
75 United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1984).
76 Id. at 1453.
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nition of involuntary servitude in United States v. Kozminski.77  The
Court narrowed the definition to encompass only situations “in
which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or
threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or
threat of coercion through law or the legal process.”78  At the same
time that it closed a door, however, the Court opened a window:
Our holding does not imply that evidence of other means of
coercion, or of poor working conditions, or of the victim’s spe-
cial vulnerabilities is irrelevant in a prosecution under these stat-
utes . . . . a trial court could properly find that evidence of other
means of coercion or of extremely poor working conditions is
relevant to corroborate disputed evidence regarding the use or
threatened use of physical or legal coercion, the defendant’s in-
tention in using such means, or the causal effect of such
conduct.79
Thus, the quality of working conditions themselves were still
relevant, at least as evidence of involuntary servitude.  Congress
partially rejected the Supreme Court’s limited definition of invol-
untary servitude in the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protec-
tion Act of 2000.80
The shift in focus of the definition of  “servitude” over time
has moved the emphasis away from formalistic requirements of
debt to cases where extremely harsh working conditions could pro-
vide corroborating evidence of coercion, applied by the threat or
use of violence or legal process.
C. From Individualism to Collective Power
For those seeking protection for collective rather than individ-
ual rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, judicial opinions
77 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
78 Id. at 952.
79 Id.
80 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, §102(b)(13) P.L.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
Involuntary Servitude statutes are intended to reach cases in which the
persons are held in a condition of servitude through nonviolent coer-
cion.  In United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988), the Supreme
Court found that section 1584 of title 18, United States Code, should be
narrowly interpreted, absent a definition of involuntary servitude by
Congress.  As a result, that section was interpreted to criminalize only
servitude that is brought about through use or threatened use of physi-
cal or legal coercion, and to exclude other conduct that can have the
same purpose and effect.
Id.
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sometimes seem to point in two directions.  In Pollock v. Williams,81
striking down a law nearly identical to the one at issue in Bailey v.
Alabama,82 the Supreme Court issued the following dictum: “The
undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by
the Antipeonage Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain
a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the
United States.”83  Only a few sentences later, however, the Court
made clear the limits on this freedom:
[I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working
conditions, or treatment is the right to change employers.
When the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the
obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and no
incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome
conditions of work.  Resulting depression of wages and working
conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer
under this system, but every other with whom his labor comes in
competition.84
The statement is layered with complexity.  While it explicitly
embraces an individual rather than a collective right, it frames that
right in terms of power; the reason that the right to quit is impor-
tant is because it corrects the imbalance between worker and em-
ployer.  Though the opinion might exaggerate the impact of this
power, it does recognize the need to strike a balance between capi-
tal and labor.  Finally, the statement reflects the New Deal progres-
sive understanding that competition spreads and replicates
working conditions throughout the market, but stops just short of
recognizing the social dimensions of labor that were at the heart of
Reconstruction-era thinking.  The opinion thus looks back to the
Lochner concept of freedom of contract, with its mythical equality
between capital and labor, even while it accepts the progressive no-
tion that working conditions should be standardized throughout
the national economy; it does not see as far as the Thirteenth
Amendment’s original meaning.
Organized labor would use statements like these to challenge
infringements on the collective right to quit work as a group (i.e.,
to strike) even after the passage of the Wagner Act.  In United States
v. Petrillo,85 the Chicago Federation of Musicians was charged with
violating the Federal Communications Act when it directed three
81 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
82 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
83 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944).
84 Id. at 18.
85 68 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
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of its members to leave their jobs and picket their employer, a ra-
dio station.  The Illinois District Court agreed with the union that
the restriction on the right to leave work in a group violated the
Thirteenth Amendment: “[t]he freedom to quit and refuse to un-
dertake work may as readily be exercised through a group organi-
zation as individually.”86  The Supreme Court overturned this
holding, but with noticeable reticence and minimal discussion:
[W]e consider the Thirteenth Amendment question only with
reference to the statute on its face.  Thus considered, it plainly
does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment.  Whether some
possible attempted application of it to particular persons in par-
ticular sets of circumstances would violate the Thirteenth
Amendment is a question we shall not pass upon until it is ap-
propriately presented.87
The Court had such an opportunity just two years later, but
declined to take advantage of it.  In 1945, a Wisconsin local of The
International Union, United Automobile Workers of America
(“UAW”) began holding a series of work actions against Briggs &
Stratton, a manufacturer.88  The union’s tactic was to call unan-
nounced union meetings on work time, which all employees were
to attend.  This amounted to a series of intermittent work stop-
pages, for which the employer could not prepare.  The NLRB is-
sued a cease and desist order, which the UAW challenged, arguing
that the order, as applied, violated the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court dismissed this argument in a single paragraph,
saying, “[t]he facts afford no foundation for the contention that
any action of the State has the purpose or effect of imposing any
form of involuntary servitude.”89
Thirteenth Amendment claims as applied to labor rights
would gradually become dormant in the federal courts as unions
increasingly confined themselves to the processes of the NLRB.
They reemerged periodically, however, at the state level.  In County
Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County v. Los Angeles County
Employees’ Ass’n.,90 the California Supreme Court held that it was
not unlawful for public employees to strike.  In so doing, the ma-
jority opinion speculated that the case raised constitutional ques-
tions, but confined its holding to a discussion of the common law
86 Id at 849.
87 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
88 Int’l Union, U.A.W., A.F. of L., Local 232 v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245 (1949).
89 Id. at 251.
90 699 P. 2d 835, 38 Cal. 3d 564 (Cal. 1985).
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prohibition on public employee strikes.91  Two Justices’ concurring
opinion, however, squarely confronted the Thirteenth Amend-
ment issue.  The concurrence argued that there existed a constitu-
tional right to strike, grounded in part in the Thirteenth
Amendment92; it found a “close nexus” between the Amendment
and the right to strike.93  Reasoning from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s dicta in Bailey v. Alabama, Pollock v. Williams, and other
cases, the concurring Justices stated that “the amendment is con-
cerned not merely with the formal right to quit, but also with the
practical ability of working people to protect their interests in the work-
place,”94 and that “[t]o withdraw the right to strike is to deprive the
worker of his or her only effective bargaining power.”95  The opin-
ion’s discussion of this right was far-ranging, and included a cri-
tique of previous opinions that had rejected constitutional
protections for strikers.  It also connected broad union rights with
the First Amendment rights of association and speech,96 and con-
sidered the application of these protections to boycotts.97
To date, this opinion has been the most thorough discussion
of Thirteenth Amendment labor rights in a judicial opinion.  It is a
good example of how the rights to organize, to strike, and to show
solidarity with other workers might be connected with constitu-
tional protections.  While limited in its effect, it provides some
hope that labor’s constitutional claims might be revived and given
life once again.
D. Room for Growth
While most of the holdings of federal cases discussing the
91 38 Cal. 3d at 587–93.
92 Id. at 594 (Reynoso, J., and Bird, C.J., concurring).
93 Id. at 598.  Though it did not explicitly reference Justice Marshall’s dissent in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the concur-
rence’s use of the “nexus” language suggests the approach to Equal Protection cases
described in that opinion.  Marshall’s dissent stated:
[T]he task in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not men-
tioned in the Constitution.  As the nexus between the specific constitu-
tional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the
nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree
of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discrimi-
natory basis must be adjusted accordingly.
411 U.S. at 102–3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 38 Cal. 3d at 598 (emphasis in original).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 600.
97 Id. at 601.
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Thirteenth Amendment are unhelpful in establishing concrete
rights, the concurrence in Los Angeles County  Employees’ Ass’n. dem-
onstrates that their dicta provide some spark of hope.  There may
be some room at the margins of these cases for litigation that could
expand rights discourse.  While it is unlikely, particularly given the
current composition of the courts, that full-blown rights of organi-
zation and labor action will be embraced on constitutional
grounds, the foundation might be laid to begin the construction of
legislative protections.
One starting point might be the holding in United States v. Koz-
minski.98  While the case limited the definition of involuntary servi-
tude, it explicitly recognized factors that could be used as evidence
of servitude:  “evidence of other means of coercion or of extremely
poor working conditions is relevant to corroborate disputed evi-
dence regarding . . . use of physical or legal coercion.”99  The opin-
ion stated that “the victim’s special vulnerabilities” might be
relevant as well.100  This suggests that involuntary servitude cases
might probe into important areas.  Cases where a worker is paid
subminimum wages, or where health and safety laws are routinely
violated, immediately suggest evidence that might support convic-
tions for involuntary servitude.  The reference to “special vulnera-
bilities” practically begs for an examination of factors such as
immigration status, past criminal convictions, or even of socioeco-
nomic position as it is tied to race and gender.  As one example,
advocates should be quick to point out to prosecutors101 that under
98 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
99 Id. at 952.
100 Id.
101 Because the anti-peonage statutes are criminal laws, it is difficult for advocates
to control such litigation.  There are a few possible solutions to this problem.  One is
to persuade a court to imply a civil remedy directly under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  Although two cases to date have declined to create
such a remedy (Turner v. Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978), and Man-
liguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)), the decisions were both arguably
flawed in significant ways. See Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Mod-
ern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981 (2002).
Manliguez suggested another approach: implying a civil remedy from the criminal stat-
utes.  226 F. Supp. at 384.  This would import the same evidentiary standards dis-
cussed by the Supreme Court.  Michael Wishnie has also suggested that advocates
bring claims for Thirteenth Amendment violations under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
See generally Michael Wishnie, Immigrant Workers and the Domestic Enforcement of Interna-
tional Labor Rights, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 529 (2002).  While this would not directly
expand the definitions of servitude under criminal statutes, it would allow reference
to international norms on involuntary servitude and labor rights.  Finally, he points
out that reporting criminal cases to prosecutors can help lead to the regularization of
workers’ immigration status. Id. at 541.
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Hoffman Plastics,102 undocumented workers’ practical ability to ad-
dress their working conditions through the rights afforded by the
NLRA is severely compromised.
The rights-expanding purpose of litigating involuntary servi-
tude cases, or reporting them to criminal prosecutors, is twofold.
First, it allows courts to expand on the connection between work-
ing conditions and the balance of power in the workplace, opening
the door to a broader understanding of the role that various forms
of coercion play in work relationships.  Second, it calls on courts to
look at the status of the workers involved, and to confront squarely
the dilemma that undocumented workers find themselves in after
Hoffman.  While a substantial amount of criticism has been leveled
at the decision outside of the courts,103 judicial recognition of the
ways in which U.S. law makes undocumented workers “specially vul-
nerable” can be a useful form of pressure on the courts and the
legislature to address the connection between immigration status
and labor rights.
III. APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION
A. Badges and Incidents
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment provides that “Con-
gress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.”104  Under this section, the Congress of 1867 passed the anti-
peonage laws and criminal statutes to punish slavery, as well as the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.105  The Supreme Court held relatively
early in the Amendment’s history that it applied not only to state,
but to private action.106  The Court circumscribed the extent of
Congress’ reach, too; in The Civil Rights Cases it held that the Thir-
teenth Amendment granted Congress the power to pass laws to
102 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
103 See, e.g., Gabriela Robin, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: A Step Backwards for
All Workers in the United States, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 679 (2003); Thomas J.
Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: How the Supreme Court Eroded Labor Law and
Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. 313 (2003); David Ruiz
Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and
the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2003); Beth
L. Throne, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Empowering the Unscrupulous Em-
ployer and Stigmatizing the Undocumented Worker, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 595
(2003).
104 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
105 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1982–1992).
106 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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“abolish[ ] all badges and incidents of slavery,”107 but drew a limit
by holding that “[m]ere discriminations on account of race or
color were not regarded as badges of slavery.”108  The Court had set
another limitation earlier in The Slaughterhouse Cases109; while it
held that the prohibition against slavery did not apply only to freed
slaves of African descent, it set a rule of construction that “it is
necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the per-
vading spirit . . . the evil which they were designed to remedy.”110
Thus, while Congress clearly has the power to eliminate slavery
or debt peonage, and pass laws applying to private actors to do so,
it is unclear whether the “badges and incidents” language would
apply to anyone but descendants of slaves held before the Civil
War. Professor Maria L. Ontiveros of the University of San Fran-
cisco School of Law argues that it could; with reference to Hoffman
Plastics she says “the inability to appeal to statutorily provided labor
rights is a ‘badge[ ] and incident’ of slavery that violates the Thir-
teenth Amendment.”111  It is true that the inability to access the
courts is among the “badges and incidents” which the Supreme
Court has recognized as within Congress’s power to prohibit
through legislation.112  But while the Court has held that Congress
may eliminate slavery and the badges and incidents that flowed
from its pre-Civil War existence, it has not to date held that the
existence of badges and incidents of slavery establishes a slave-like
condition.
Of course, as discussed earlier, the presence of legal impedi-
ments that parallel the recognized “badges and incidents” of slav-
ery may constitute evidence of coercion under federal criminal
statutes.  While Congress may well be hesitant, for political reasons,
to exercise its Thirteenth Amendment power to overturn Hoffman
Plastics—as Professor Ontiveros argues it has the ability to do113—
107 Id. at 20.
108 Id. at 25.
109 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
110 Id. at 72.
111 Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers’ Rights in a Post-Hoffman World—Organizing
Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 651 (2004).
112 In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court listed as “incidents” of slavery: “[c]ompulsory
service for the benefit of the master, restraint of his movements except by the master’s
will, disability to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a
witness against a white person . . . .” 109 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).  Judicially held
incidents have also included “the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the
right to live wherever a white man can live,” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 443 (1968), and (under the freedom to enter into contracts) the right to send
one’s child to a private school.  Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976).
113 Ontiveros, supra note 111, at 675.
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recognition by courts that low wages and conditions are closely tied
to the inability of undocumented workers to access legal protec-
tions would both provide doctrinal support for such legislation and
could shift the debate. Overturning Hoffman would not be simply
about protecting migrant workers, but about eliminating a form of
coerced labor.
There are other facets of labor law with direct connections to
slavery.  For example, Professor James Atleson has drawn the con-
nection between status conditions under slavery and other forms of
servitude and the doctrine of the duty of loyalty under the
NLRA.114 This doctrine, enunciated in cases such as Jefferson Stan-
dard,115 denies the  protection of labor law to workers who dispar-
age their employer in some manner not directly related to a labor
dispute.  The impact of this rule is essentially to chill speech by
employees, placing them in a position of vulnerability if they
choose to speak freely about their employers.  The consequence is
to remove one avenue of appeal to the public in a labor dispute,
and to keep the reality of workplace relations hidden from public
view.
Given the connection between the notion that employees are
forbidden from speaking ill of their employers and the status as-
sumptions that emerged from the institution of slavery, Congress
could feasibly pass a labor law reform bill that would include the
elimination of the duty of loyalty under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment.  Such an enactment would have the practical effect of re-
forming social relations that continue to shape the modern
workplace, but that are as antiquated as systems of bonded labor.
B. Wage and Hour Laws
Tying low wages to involuntary servitude, as United States v. Koz-
minski did, suggests another possible arena for Thirteenth Amend-
ment legislation.  Federal minimum wage and maximum hour
legislation, in the form of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”),116 is, like the National Labor Relations Act, grounded in
the Commerce Clause.  But if low wages are sufficiently connected
with involuntary servitude, it might be possible to pass similar legis-
lation under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Given the persistent
114 JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 87–90
(1984). Professor Atleson currently teaches at the University of Buffalo Law School.
115 NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464
(1953).
116 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201–19 (West 2008).
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problem of undocumented workers who are never paid at all for
the work they do,117 framing unpaid wages as slavery makes a good
deal of sense intuitively.  Artificially suppressed wages might be
framed as a “badge and incident” of slavery insofar as it results
from acts of coercion that are akin to bonded labor.
In her book Suburban Sweatshops,118 Workplace Project founder
Jennifer Gordon describes the fight of several worker centers in
New York to pass the Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act, a law de-
signed to toughen state wage standards and enforcement mecha-
nisms.  A federal version of this bill, passed under the Thirteenth
Amendment, would have significant advantages over the FLSA.
For one, the Thirteenth Amendment is universal in its application;
it does not discriminate on the basis of citizenship or occupation.
Because there is no need to tie it to commercial activity, there
would be no need to establish that a worker is engaged in an enter-
prise in interstate commerce.119
Additionally, there would be little justification for exempting
large numbers of workers from the bill’s provisions, as the FLSA
does.120  In particular, exemptions such as those applying to farm
workers and domestic service workers (who were originally ex-
cluded from minimum wage legislation as a concession to South-
ern Democrats who wanted to keep down the wages of African-
American workers still heavily employed in these occupations)121
could be directly overturned as “badges and incidents” of slavery.
In terms of coalition building, there is some risk that an exclu-
sive focus on the rights of the most exploited workers, while a sensi-
ble approach to the Thirteenth Amendment, will not include
workers who are not earning wages close to the legal minimum,
and who do not suffer from the same “special vulnerabilities” as the
most exploited workers.  One issue that might have broader appeal
than the minimum wage is maximum hour legislation.  Current
wage and hour laws afford workers no right to refuse to work over-
time when required by an employer, although union contracts
might structure the process for how overtime is distributed.  In The
117 For some of the most egregious examples, given the context, see Immigrant
Justice Project, Southern Poverty Law Center, Broken Levees, Broken Promises: New
Orleans’ Migrant Workers in their Own Words (2008), available at http://www.
splcenter.org/legal/news/article.jsp?pid=21.
118 JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
(2005).
119 Cf. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206(a), 207(a)(1) (West 2008).
120 See 29 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West 2008).
121 Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination
in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1353–56 (1987).
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Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court said that “[t]he long exis-
tence of African slavery in this country gave us a very distinct no-
tion of what it was, and what were its necessary incidents.
Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, re-
straint of his movements except by the master’s will . . . and such
like burdens and incapacities were the inseparable incidents of the
institution.”122  If compulsory service and the restraint of one’s
movement were “badges and incidents” of the slavery relationship,
then nothing should preclude Congress from eliminating them
under section two of the Thirteenth Amendment.  The fact that
the same incidents are shared by “free” labor, as they were at the
time of the Thirteenth Amendment’s founding, simply illustrates
the power of the “free labor” philosophy of the amendment’s foun-
ders.  The condition of one laborer affects all others by association;
the oppressiveness of the work relationship under the institution of
slavery caused all labor to be viewed with disdain, and led to com-
promises of free workers’ rights as well as those of the slave.  To
give the master ultimate power over the time of the servant is an
incident of slavery, because it is a relationship that would have
been unthinkable under a regime of truly free work relations.  It
exists, as the Thirteenth Amendment’s framers might have argued,
because we view all work as essentially slave-like.
Grounding minimum work standards in the elimination of in-
voluntary servitude also highlights the moral dimension of work
conditions in a way that a focus on interstate commerce does not.
This is as important to the experiences of workers engaged in a
movement as it is for the legal framework.  Framing the issue as
“slave wages” posits workers’ demands as a matter of personal dig-
nity and freedom.  This can have a deep impact on how workers
relate to their movements and the organizations within them.
IV. ORGANIZING
One hundred years ago, the labor movement’s demands were
couched in the language and theory of constitutional rights.  The
fact that the legal system rejected the movement participants’ un-
derstanding of the Constitution did not deter them from making
the claims.  In resisting a Kansas law that would have submitted
miners’ disputes to an Industrial Court for adjudication, Alexander
Howat, president of the miners’ local, said “whether the law is de-
clared constitutional or not, we have made up our minds that we
122 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
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would rather go to prison than to be a party to enslaving the work-
ers of this State.”123  James Pope calls this form of resistance “con-
stitutional insurgency.” Beginning from the premise that the
purpose of a written Constitution is to allow the people, rather
than the courts, to read and interpret it, this form of resistance
uses constitutional claims as an animating principle.  Its use can be
traced through any number of successful movements, from wo-
men’s suffrage to civil rights.
Jennifer Gordon describes a similar organizing theory in her
book Suburban Sweatshops.124  Through her discussion of “Rights
Talk,” she paints a picture of immigrant workers who go from be-
lieving (erroneously) that they have no rights to both claiming the
limited rights that they do have and, more importantly, insisting on
rights that the legal system denies them.125  The process, as impor-
tant as the product, is a key part of developing a group conscious-
ness that fuels organizing: “In the discussions that grew from the
organization’s critical approach to talking about rights, Workplace
Project members imagined the forms [that] group unity and action
to build power might take—and simultaneously reinforced a sense
of group identity through their deliberations.”126
This describes workers actively engaged not only in formulat-
ing their aspirations and goals as a movement, but in formulating a
strategy to achieve them.  It is a model that draws strength from the
active engagement of workers, rather than looking at internal de-
mocracy as an impediment to power.127  This is the dominant
model of worker centers organized along models of participatory
democracy.  This model is critical to leadership development and
to maintaining an active base of members.128
The level of engagement that worker centers require of their
members meshes well with the philosophy underlying a Thirteenth
Amendment approach to labor rights. The current economic
model of unionism is built on a legal theory based in the com-
123 Letter from Alexander Howat, President, District 14, United Mine Workers of
America, to John H. Walker (Mar. 8, 1921), quoted in Pope, Labor’s Constitution, supra
note 6, at 970.
124 GORDON, supra note 118.
125 Id. at 167–73.
126 Id. at 172.
127 In Democracy is Power, Mike Parker and Martha Gruelle argue against what they
see as the predominant view within unions, that democracy and power are in tension
with one another.  They argue instead that democracy creates a form of power that
unions desperately need to embrace. PARKER & GRUELLE, supra note 15, at 33.
128 JANICE FINE, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF
THE DREAM 208 (2006).
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merce clause, goals that are framed in terms of union density and
prevailing wages, and an organizing practice measured in terms of
numbers of members rather than depth of commitment.  In con-
trast, a fundamental rights model grounds its legal philosophy in
ideas of freedom of association and civic participation, articulates
its goals as respect and full inclusion within society, and defines the
success of its organizing in terms of members’ engagement with
the organization.  It demands redress of the full range of social
impediments that are tied to the work relationship.  An organiza-
tion built on this model is more stable because members have a
personal stake in not only the goals, but in their inclusion within
the group.  Gordon asserts, “Through structures to develop inter-
nal democracy and member leadership, it can model the democ-
racy it works toward in the outside world.”129  The internal life of
worker centers reflects the aspirational goals of fundamental labor
rights.
V. WORKERS CENTERS AND RIGHTS CONSCIOUSNESS
A shift to a regime of labor rights grounded in the Thirteenth
Amendment is unlikely to occur without a movement behind it.
Incremental legal changes, such as those discussed above, will be
useful steps along the way, but are unlikely to bring about major
transformation.
Labor unions would initially seem to be well situated to carry
out this project, and indeed, their political strength, staff and fi-
nancial resources, and presence in so many communities through-
out the country make them important participants.  Unions’
current proposals for labor law reform, however, are not particu-
larly reflective of a Thirteenth Amendment approach.
The Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”), the current legisla-
tive project of the AFL–CIO and the Change to Win coalition,
would allow workers to organize unions through a card check pro-
cess,130 in which a union is recognized as soon as a majority of
workers in a given workplace sign cards stating their intent to or-
ganize a union.131  It also mandates that, if a union and an em-
ployer are unable to negotiate a contract within a given time frame,
129 GORDON, supra note 118, at 273.
130 Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov/ (search term “Employee Free Choice Act” in “Search Bill Text”).
131 The definition of a “workplace,” or, in the NLRA’s terms, a “bargaining unit,” is
a complicated question that has a substantial body of agency law built around it.  This
matter is beyond the scope of this paper.
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they take the subjects of bargaining before an arbitrator, whose de-
cision will be binding.
The law would facilitate formation of unions, but displaces the
participation of workers in the organizing process.  Organizing a
union can take place through a minimal commitment.  As under
the current bargaining framework, winning a good contract will
still require significant mobilization of the workers in a bargaining
unit, but there will be some foundational level created by the pros-
pect of binding arbitration.  The default position shifts; now, the
union will end up with a contract that likely includes some gains,
even if the membership is not highly mobilized.
Even under the current NLRA framework, the challenges of
organizing and winning a first contract can be liberatory processes,
through which workers develop a critical consciousness and be-
come mobilized to confront their employers.  With an eased path
to unionization, the opportunity for such mobilization, in which
worker engagement and participation form the core of organizing
strategy, fades somewhat.  The fastest and easiest path to growth
under the EFCA follows a track that further concedes the narrow
definition of the work relationship that the economic model of
unionism embraces.
This is not to say that EFCA is a bad thing for the labor move-
ment.  At a time when private sector union density is below ten
percent, an easier path to union growth is essential.  Even without
a deeper vision of workplace rights and an active membership base,
union density has a major impact on the power of unions to affect
working conditions.  There is no doubt that most unions will always
fight for better contracts, and engage in qualitative membership
mobilization in order to achieve them.  The danger lies in limiting
the goals of the movement to growth and power building, without
also articulating broader social goals.  An organizing method based
on constitutional insurgency and “rights talk” posits a feedback
model in which the pursuit of broad-based rights spurs further
growth.  It is growth reflected in the building of internal capacity,
not just numerical increase.
As discussed above, worker centers are in some ways ideally
suited to carry forth this project of rights-based organizing.  Many
of them are based in constituencies that are outside of the main-
stream labor movement, with members who have some of the
strongest claims to Thirteenth Amendment protections.  Many of
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them have significant legal staff that could take on litigation.132
And the grant-making institutions that are often crucial to their
financial support may have a wish to support projects that include
impact litigation.133
One of the major challenges to worker centers that might en-
gage in this project will be the need for legislative power.  Individ-
ual worker centers, with a base in a single community and
memberships that include large numbers of noncitizens, will find
lobbying difficult.  The best hope for addressing this dilemma lies
in building alliances, not only with other worker centers, but with
unions and other advocacy groups.  A second challenge lies in con-
necting a distinctly American constitutional discourse with the po-
litical traditions of workers coming from countries with different
histories, and with a wide range of experiences.  Within this chal-
lenge, however, lies the opportunity to develop a labor conscious-
ness with a distinctly international character; it invites comparison
of domestic worker protections with international labor norms,134
and suggests a new vision of workers’ rights that transcends na-
tional boundaries, even while it recognizes close connections with
national traditions.
The challenges inherent in developing a fundamental rights
approach to labor law, one rooted in constitutional and interna-
tional protections against slavery and involuntary servitude, are
many.  But they carry with them tremendous opportunities to
strengthen worker movements, to set new standards of what work
should provide, and to shift public consciousness about labor issues
to encompass the broader human and social dimensions of work.
The fundamental rights project carries with it the promise to com-
plete the work of those who fought for the elimination of all forms
of slavery, and to bring all working people a step closer to
liberation.
132 FINE, supra note 128, at 74.
133 Interview with Deborah Axt, Director of Legal and Support Services, Make the
Road, NY, in New York, NY (Mar. 19, 2008).
134 In 2000, Human Rights Watch published a report detailing how U.S. labor law
falls short of international standards articulated by the International Labor Organiza-
tion and in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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